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France and other member states to honor the decision to continue accession talks, describing it as a matter 
of credibility for the Union.† Barroso's opinion it actually sais nothing important, but this happened in mid 
2007. My opinion is that Barroso tried to maintain the public opinion at the normal level, not to agitate the EU 
citizens, neither the Turkish. The same person declared Turkey will be prepared to join EU in about 10 
years.But on 27 July 2010, David Cameron (United Kingdom prime minister), during a visit to Turkey has 
promised to "fight" for Turkey's membership of the European Union, saying he is "angry" at the slow pace of 
negotiations, saying:  "A European Union without Turkey at its heart was "not stronger but weaker... not more 
secure but less... not richer but poorer." ‡ I think that "slow pace" are just nice words said by Mr. Cameron, 
because Turkey's situation it is delicate,  and it has been so delicate especially in the last 10-12 years. Turkey 
has to take action, because they have the power and the resources to prove EU that they really want to be part 
of the Union.  
The U.S. has been a staunch supporter of Turkey's entry into the EU as a full member for more than a 
decade. American policy on EU-Turkey became one of the main pillars of bilateral cooperation between 
Washington and Ankara and successive U.S. administrations invested considerable diplomatic energy and 
capital in lobbying among America's European allies on Turkey's behalf.This project is analyzing Turkey 
present situation regarding European Union candidacy, and also United States of America influence regarding 
this subject. I will start with a brief introduction of how Turkey - USA relation evolved during the last century, 
and especially I will focus on the trio Turkey - USA - EU.  
United States had a major impact on Turkey as its influence helped signing the Customs Union 
Agreement in 1995, and after that for accepting Turkey's candidacy in 1999. USA had a important influence on 
Turkey and the relation between this two countries was rather closer and closer. But things took a turn in 2003 
because of the war in Iraq which led to one of the deepest crises in the history of US-Turkey as well as 
transatlantic relations. One of the key consequences has been Turkey's foreign policy activism in the region 
which, while observed with interest in Europe, has not necessarily contributed to further Turkey's accession 
process. 
2. United States of America  influence over Turkey in pre 1999 period 
 
As we review recent history, we observe that USA is keen to make Turkey an EU member with full rights. 
So now, some questions appear for the Europeans: "Why is USA so involved in Turkeys joining process? ". So 
this made the Europeans not to take any risk, and it resulted the following situation. 
One of the reasons for the EU's skepticism regarding Turkey's membership rested precisely in the long and 
consolidated cooperation between Turkey and US, particularly on security and military questions , which 
fanned the so-called "Trojan Horse Syndrome": that is the perception and concern that US support for Turkey 
was motivated by the American desire to shape from within the EU's internal evolution according for US 
interests. 
Despite this concerns, the relation between EU proceeded exactly as USA wanted and predicted. After an 
intense lobbying activity by the White House, also by the European Social Democrats and the European 
Parliament led to the signing in 1995 of the Custom Union Agreement between Turkey and the EU. So starting 
1996 the first step, and in my opinion the most important step, was taken by the Turkish people.  
The Clinton Administration also successfully prevented an armed conflict between Greece and Turkey in 1996. 
Of course we can only imagine the damage an armed conflict would provoke for EU - Turkey relation, if the 
relation would have existed after such a situation. Alongside this, the US government sought to help all parties 
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reach a durable and mutual agreed solution in Cyprus.  
During the decades past between the Second World War and 1999 the relation between USA and Turkey 
was strong, and stronger as time passed. The USA was successful in edging the relation between Turkey and 
EU. Also USA helped in avoiding an armed conflict with Greece, and in reaching a mutual resolution with 
Cyprus. But most important for Turkey, USA managed to obtain positive answers from European leaders and 
so the acceptance of Turkey as an official candidate for joining EU.  
3. United States of America - Turkey relations between 1999 – 2003 
 
It is clear now that Turkey is getting closer and closer to the European Union. One consequence of this 
fact is that direct influence of the USA is starting to wane. After December 1999, Turkey will concern 
Europeans primarily as a matter of domestic policy, as a country which has been acknowledged officially as a 
candidate to EU accession, thus opening the prospects of Turkey's membership on a par with powerful member 
states such as France and Germany. This is an important turning point in Turkey - EU relations, as from now on 
the main criteria governing the evolution of this, is directly depending on issues such as democracy, minorities, 
freedoms, human rights  and, of course, economic performance.  
The terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001, in Spain on March 2004, and in London 
in July 2005, led to a hyper-securitization of the international system. In turn, Washington decided to reinforce 
its connection with Ankara on the traditional core of the relationship, that being security. Former US 
ambassador to Turkey , Mark Parris pointed out that even after the cold war ended Turkey provided its security 
importance for US policy: "From a security perspective, the military dimension of the relationship proved as 
important as during the Cold War"§  Alongside this and in line with thinking the US persisted in its strong 
backing of EU - Turkey relations.  In 2002 the Secretary of Defense declared that: "history suggests that a 
European Union that welcomes will be even stronger and safe. The alternative, exclusionary choice is surely 
unthinkable".** 
In contrast with the Pre-1999 period US failed to obtain a positive answer from the European Union, and 
thus did not obtain a specific date for the opening of Turkey's accession talks with the EU. Also in this period 
European leaders began voicing their complaints about US insistence and meddling regarding Turkey's 
accession process and the Trojan Horse syndrome, which had always been in the back-minds of Europeans.  
At a critical moment when Europe was trying to build its own new identity, presenting itself as a non-military 
superpower, prioritizing diplomacy over other coercive means - Turkey's involvement in the Iraq war became a 
matter of identity. In fact, on 10 February 2003, Belgium, France and Germany later joined by Russia, vetoed a 
US-backed measure to authorize NATO to organize a military plan to protect Turkey in case it would be 
attacked by Iraq. ††  European Union, in my opinion, proved by taking this decision that they are not 
encouraging  Turkey's involvement in Iraq war, and that the complete opposite would be a desirable decision. 
We can observe now the negative indirect influence of the USA over Turkey. When requesting to deploy 
troops on Turkish territory, Washington had assumed that Turkey would allow the US attack from Turkish 
territory. Europeans believed that if the purpose of Turkeys accession was to help the revisit the Middle East, 
starting with Iraq, then they failed to see the benefits of it. Thus, the persistent American pro-Turkey pressure 
on the EU starting having one important negative backlash:  EU began associating strong US insistence 
exclusively for US foreign policy interests in the Middle East and neighboring regions rather than a genuine 
 
 
§
 PARRIS M., "Starting Over: U.S. - Turkey relations in the Post - Iraq War Era, The Washington Institute for 
Near East Policy", www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/878248  
**
 Idem 
††
 Public Broadcasting Service, www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/euro.html 
1700   Ziya Kivanc Kirac et al. /  Procedia Economics and Finance  15 ( 2014 )  1697 – 1703 
concern over the EU's own future. Moreover the US's downplaying of Turkey's domestic shortcomings and its 
emphasis on geopolitics and strategic significance for the US and EU alike. This opinion also tended to 
strengthen nationalist and euro-sceptic groups in Turkey, who became increasingly convinced that the US-
Turkey-Israel axis represented the natural and most desirable structure and reference point for Ankara's foreign 
policy as well as its domestic evolution, representing a viable and far less costly alternative to the EU.  
4. United States of America influence post 2003 
 
The Turkish Grand National Assembly failed to pass a motion that would allow USA to bring American 
troops on Turkish land in order to open a northern front to attack Iraq. Actually the bill in fact obtained 264 
votes in favour, 250 votes against, and 19 abstentions., that is to say that given the two thirds majority 
requirement for approval, the bill was rejected just by 3 votes. This was an important piece of the puzzle, as 
since this moment the Turkish-American relations suffered an important cool down.  The Turkish government's 
shift in its Iraq policy was due to popular pressure and street demonstrations. On my opinion in this moment 
Turkey decided to "turn face" towards EU, with this shift.  
In view of US inability to directly influence Ankara, Washington's started speaking to Europeans about 
Turkey in essentialist and idealistic terms. This had an overall negative effect on the EU.  In 29th June2004 the 
French President Chirac declared at a NATO summit: "If President Bush really said that in the way that I read, 
then not only did he gone too far, but he went into territory that isn't his purpose and his goal to give any advice 
to the EU, and in this area it was a bit as if I were to tell Americans how they should handle their relationship 
with Mexico"‡‡ . President's Chirac words could not have been clearer, he underlined perfectly the fact that this 
is not American's business to interfere with EU-Turkey relations, either to put pressure on accepting Turkey. If 
the EU were to adjudicate on its borders, neighbours, and above all identity the choice had to be EU's own 
decision, free from external interfering or pressure.  
Furthermore the Turkish No vote for the second war in Iraq also led to some important reconsideration on 
Turkey by Europeans. While accidental, the Turkish parliamentary vote was interpreted by some as an instance 
of Turkish democracy and independence from heavy US pressure. Actually regardless the real sources or 
causes of this vote, or how this managed to happen, it was viewed by the public as a manifestation towards 
democracy, helping to deconstruct the image of Turkey as an American Trojan horse. Maybe this situation 
could have brought a better and closer relation between the EU and Turkey, yet this was not the case. 
Perhaps because both Turks and Europeans were aware that US represents the only guarantee for  all Turkish 
security and foreign policy problems, and that the EU does not embody a real security guarantee. In mid 2003 
Turkey agreed for a possibility of emergency landing and fly zone for US aircrafts, and also for transportation 
of non war equipment.  During the same meeting the two sides agreed on a 8.5$ billion loan for Ankara.  So we 
can observe that even if it was a No vote, Turkey tried to restore a partnership with USA, which also diluted the 
image of independent Turkey for EU. 
A second and related explanation regards the fact that both Turkey and US share a similar vision 
regarding foreign policy, and security, than the EU. Setting aside disagreements regarding Iraq's constitutional 
future and the PKK, Ankara and Washington understand both that security can be obtained through military 
force and capacity in the area, very different than EU, which promotes diplomacy as the main choice to resolve 
conflicts. Actually I think we should also consider the situation in Middle East, because EU does not want 
neighbour troubles, does not agree military actions, and an eastern enlargement might also bring this.  Bringing 
the Middle Eastern quagmire to Europe's backyard, combined with the perception of clash of civilizations, 
contributed to the ensuing rise of islamophobia, which has inevitable entailed that Turkey has fallen in the 
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opposing camp of a wider global civilizational struggle. This raised also extra worries for the European, which 
are seeing the Muslims as being different then other Europeans. 
These negative reactions were also evident in the mind of elite EU political personnel. German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel declared that Turkey would represent a liability for the EU, because it is culturally different.§§ 
The paradigm of the clash of civilizations propelled by the US - War on Terror and the War in Iraq, 
unintendedly dovetailed with an exacerbated EU skepticism regarding Turkeys accession process. 
Hence, while it is true that the Iraq war dug an apparent and formal ditch between the US and Turkey, this did 
not suffice to fill the one between Brussels and Ankara. So far for the above mentioned reasons the indirect US 
influence on EU-Turkey relations was far from positive. Sailing away from Washington did not entail 
redirecting on a course to Brussels, but rather pushed Ankara in the open sea, The Greater Middle East.  
Summing up, the US-led war in Iraq set the context and accelerated Turkey's increasing activism in the Middle 
East. Turkey's resistance towards Kurdish autonomy has not been shared by many in the US or Israel. Also 
Turkish-Iranian links upset the Bush administration's plans to built pipeline networks to transport Caspian 
resources by avoiding Iranian and Russian territory. ***  By contrast, Turkey's rapprochement towards its 
neighbours and its increasingly reliance on soft power as a mean to achieve its goals has rendered Turkey's 
foreign and security policies far more congruent and likely to those of the EU. But actually this did not brought 
Turkey closer to the Union. This assertiveness towards EU might still have opposite outcomes, I am referring 
especially to identity and foreign policy. 
Regarding identity a positive influence is possible if the EU is able to share its principal values with 
Ankara, that is viewing Turkey as country where individual rights and liberties are being strengthened, where 
bottom up solutions and transition processes are worth more than the top down imposition of rules, and where 
the military has a moderate power. However, if Turkey is viewed as a Muslim, Middle Eastern country and the 
EU as political entity with fixed borders, Turkey's accession process will inevitably remain troubled.  
Regarding foreign policy, it depends on how much the EU wants to engage with the Middle East. If the Union 
commits to a strong engagement Turkey would enrich the Common Foreign and Security Policy thanks to its 
deep knowledge and engagement in the Middle East. On the contrary, if the EU does wish to, or rather cannot 
agree internally on engaging in the region, Turkey deep presence in the Middle East may be counterproductive, 
in so far as the Union would feel as being drawn, through Turkey into the turbulent Middle East.  
Recent developments of Turkey's progress towards full membership seems to confirm a lack of EU willing to 
put the stress on foreign policy assets. Rather, the traditional liabilities related to the negotiation chapter seems 
still to play the most important role in the EU-Turkey relation.    
  
5. Present Situation 
 
It is important to remember, that in its diplomatic initiatives on behalf of Turkey's full membership, the 
U.S. has not asked its European allies to either change the membership requirements to accommodate Turkey 
or establish a special case for Turkish membership. American officials have maintained that membership rules 
are an internal EU matter and the EU has the right to apply these rules. At the same time, however, the U.S. has 
also asked the EU to offer Turkey equal treatment with the other applicants, leave the "door open for eventual 
Turkish membership", and reject any religious or cultural criteria as the basis for gaining full membership in 
the European Union Washington has also joined the EU in exerting pressure on Turkey for a settlement of the 
Cyprus conflict although it has not necessarily considered it as one of the prerequisites for membership. 
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In the near future, the U.S. is not likely to abandon its support for the inclusion of Turkey in the European 
Union. Washington's position on this issue is well established and it has become one of the important anchors 
of the bilateral ties between Washington and Ankara. However, the U.S. is not likely to pursue the highly 
visible and activist strategy to promote Turkish membership and invest as much diplomatic energy and capital 
on this issue as it has done in the past. 
The main objectives of Washington's efforts have been to prevent the EU from closing the door on the 
possibility of Turkish membership, to formally recognize Turkey's candidacy, and to set a date for the 
beginning of accession negotiations. The first two of these objectives have been met with the decision 
regarding the Turkish candidacy at the Helsinki summit. In this respect, the U.S. has made substantial progress 
toward attaining its main goals regarding its long-time support for Turkey's integration into Europe. 
Consequently, the U.S. is not likely to exert strong pressure on its European allies on the Turkish membership 
question and risk further problems in transatlantic relations in the aftermath of the war in Iraq, which has 
already created serious strains between America and several key European countries, such as France and 
Germany. 
  
6. Conclusions 
 
This article aims to give a better view of the situation in the trio Turkey-USA-EU, and how USA efforts 
influenced Turkey position regarding EU full membership from the 1980's and until present day. As stated 
above, two major recent events have been emphasized: EU acceptance of Turkey as an official candidate in 
Helsinki 1999, and four years later the Iraqi war (and its influence over Turkey). In the first part of this period, 
until 1999, USA influence was positive and direct, and the main purpose of USA - obtaining Turkey candidacy 
as a full member for EU was achieved. The American efforts were crowned by success in December 1999 in 
Helsinki, after failure in 1997. However EU suspicions about intense lobby effort from the USA never ceased 
to appear. Part of the EU important politicians were seeing this as an attempt of USA to infiltrate in the EU. 
And as we know with a population of over 75 million, Turkey would have a lot of votes in the European 
Council, and could have decisive power regarding some aspects. So, until 1999 Turkey represented for the EU 
only a foreign policy problem, not a domestic one, but with the acceptance of the Turks as official candidates 
they became a more principal problem. After this important USA influence started to wane because of the war 
in Iraq, and the decision of Turkish government not to allow USA military troops in eastern Turkey, close to 
the border. This was rather a surprising decision for both USA and EU, but this did not brought Turkey closer 
to EU membership. Part of this is that Ankara and Washington share a more similar security concept, than 
Ankara and Brussels. The Iraq war brought the chaotic Middle East in Europe's "back yard", worrying the 
European citizens about extending their way to south of Turkey. According to our understanding EU main 
problems at the time of this writing are Greece situation, and other internal issues, that came with the 
international crisis. I believe that EU wants a more stable ground and for the moment does not want to be 
dragged into Middle Eastern problems by accepting Turkey. But in the same time if Turkey will start making 
progress regarding, foreign languages, human rights, the rule of law, solve PKK problem, improve minority 
aspects, and also improve border system, we will be facing a Turkey that is closer to EU than the Middle East. 
This progress, of course, can be obtained with the help of both USA and EU. But as Ataturk said "the 
sovereignty with no condition belong to the nation" that makes it a people decision in the end. 
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